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a b s t r a c t 
To adapt to globalization, Chinese multinational ﬁrms have more exploitation of cash. This 
paper shows that Chinese multinational corporations (MNCs) do not hold signiﬁcantly 
more cash relative to domestic ﬁrms unless these multinationals heavily relay on the for- 
eign sales. In addition, the multinationals of non-State-Owned Enterprises (Non-SOEs) ex- 
hibit the insigniﬁcant difference in cash holdings for non-multinationals. We also ﬁnd that 
Chinese MNCs invest more but are less proﬁtable, especially in non-SOE subsample. Over- 
all, we conclude that the need of cash liquidity of multinational corporations in China is 
different from those in U.S. 
© 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 
1. Introduction 
Cash holding of multinational corporations (MNCs hereafter) is an essential issue in the literature of corporate capital 
structure and corporate cash holding. Considerable media attention has been devoted to the increase in cash holdings of 
U.S. multinationals, such as Apple which holds trillion dollars of cash overseas but borrows money in the domestic market. 1 
The explanations offered by academic research are based on trade-offs motivated by repatriation tax. 
Foley et al. (2007) show that the reason for cash buildup is that U.S. ﬁrms had foreign proﬁts that would have been 
taxed had they been repatriated. However, Pinkowitz et al (2016) document that in the U.S. domestic ﬁrms and multina- 
tionals (MNCs) are no different at the median, but the right tail of MNCs pushes up the average cash holding. In the most 
recent work by Fernandes and Gonenc (2014) , the authors compare the determinants of cash holdings across developed and 
emerging market using international data, and do not ﬁnd MNCs holding more cash. 
Compared with fruitful studies on MNCs in the developed markets, little attention has been paid on companies’ cash 
holding in the emerging markets. This paper shed new light on the determinants of cash holdings for multinationals in 
emerging markets, China. 
 We are grateful to Jerry Cao, Wang Rong, Jarrad Harford, Jianfeng Yu and seminar participant from Xiamen University for many helpful discussions and 
suggestions. All remaining errors are our own responsibility. 
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From existing literatures, we ﬁnd Chinese ﬁrms to become multinationals for many reasons. First, ﬁrms want to have 
access on the foreign capital market ( Deng, 2007; Ding et al., 2009 ). Unlike MNCs from other emerging markets, Chinese 
MNCs tend to invest and operate their business in the most industrialized countries, like U.S. or Japan. Wang (2002) notes 
that more than 70% Chinese foreign branches are operating in developed regions excluding Hong Kong and Macau. Another 
reason might be to seek for natural resources ( Lee, 1996 ). Most of the big State-Owned MNCs, like Sinopec and PetroChina, 
run branches in some developing but rich-resource countries, like Sudan, Indonesia etc. Besides, the ﬁercely competing 
domestic market forces many Chinese ﬁrms to globally enlarge market share. Finally, another plausible explanation for global 
extension is to seek for segment diversiﬁcation. Generally, in the early stage of global expansion, Chinese multinationals 
would invest plenty of cash to support their international operations and try to diversify their risks in other developed 
countries so that holding of cash is reduced for taking various investment opportunities. 
In this study, we use different proportions of foreign sales ratio as proxies for multinationals and focus on explaining the 
difference in cash holdings of MNCs relative to non-MNCs. Contrary to the hypothesis that MNCs hold more cash, we do not 
ﬁnd signiﬁcantly positive result for MNC dummies unless we use foreign sales ratio of 50% cutoff (MNC50) in full sample. 
Also, government in China has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence in ﬁrm’s ownership structure and outward investment decision. So, 
we divide the sample into two types, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs. We ﬁnd that SOEs in average hold 3% 
less cash than non-SOEs. In addition, the positive coeﬃcient for MNCs with 50% foreign sales ratio is only signiﬁcant for 
SOE subsample. Thus, we conclude that the insigniﬁcance in full sample is mainly caused by non-SOEs. 
To further explore why Chinese MNCs do not hold more cash, we study the investment behaviors of our sample ﬁrms. We 
ﬁnd that MNCs with more than 50% foreign sales ratio invest more than other non-MNC ﬁrms and this effect is accentuated 
in non-SOE subsample. Different from non-SOEs, MNC50s in SOE subsample actually invest less compared to non-MNCs. 
When examining the difference of future proﬁtability, we see that MNC dummies are negatively related to proﬁtability. 
The results also show that this difference is accentuated in non-SOEs regardless of the cutoff of MNC dummies, while a 
signiﬁcantly negative result for SOEs is not found. Our ﬁndings suggest that Chinese MNCs do not hold signiﬁcantly more 
cash than the domestic ones because they tend to spend the cash ﬂows and are less proﬁtable, and those two effects 
together might prevent the accumulation of ﬁrm’s excess cash. 
Our paper contributes to the literature of cash management by multinational ﬁrms. Opler et al. (1999) suggests a tradeoff
theory of cash holdings in ﬁrms. Bates et al. (2009) ﬁnd that U.S ﬁrms hold more cash for precautionary motives rather than 
agency problem. And shareholders discount companies’ foreign cash holdings as Harford et al (2014) mentioned. Cai and 
Warnock (2012) show that US domestic multinationals hold signiﬁcant foreign exposure by holding domestic equities. Recent 
literature has studied the beneﬁts and costs of cash with ﬁrm’s investment decision ( Almeida et al., 2004 ; Acharya et al., 
20 07; Bates et al., 20 09; Duchin et al., 2010 ) as well as agency problem ( Pinkowitz et al., 2006; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 
2007; Kalcheva and Lins, 2007; Harford et al., 2008 ). Our results show that, contrary to the case in developed country like 
U.S., multinational corporations in China do not hold signiﬁcantly more cash than the domestic ﬁrms since they tend to 
invest more and are less proﬁtable. 
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and sample used in this paper. Section 3 studies 
the determinants of cash for MNCs in China. Section 4 explores MNCs’ cash holdings from the investment and proﬁtability 
angles. Section 5 summarizes the paper. 
2. Data description and summary statistics 
Our baseline sample covers China-incorporated ﬁrms that are listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and the Shen- 
zhen Stock Exchange (SZSE). We only consider the main board market because the Growing Enterprise Market (GEM) in 
SZSE starts from 2009. Those ﬁnancial and utility ﬁrms are also excluded since they have different disclosure regulations 
and their liquidity positions are different from other ﬁrms. Our main variables are obtained from the Chinese Stock Market 
Accounting Research (CSMAR) for the period from 20 0 0 to 2013. The sample period is chosen to match the availability of 
foreign sales in WIND database as WIND starts to collecting foreign sales from 20 0 0. Besides, the year 20 0 0 is the ﬁrst year 
that ﬁrms are required to adopt a uniﬁed set of accounting standards and principles ( Chen et al., 2012 ). We drop off delisted 
ﬁrms, such as ST or S ∗T because they have more strict regulation requirement. Considering the impact of extreme values 
and outliers, we winsorize all ﬁrm characteristics at the 1st and 99th percentiles. As a result, the whole sample consists of 
18,135 ﬁrm-year observations with 1873 ﬁrms from 20 0 0 to 2013. 
Based on the current political and economic systems, Chinese government plays a crucial role in ﬁrm’s outward invest- 
ment and business activities. We group Chinese companies into two types, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) which are owned 
directly by the central or provincial or municipal governments and non-SOEs. Meggion et al. (2014) indicates that SOEs hold 
less cash because of soft budget constraint (SBC) effect. So in this paper, we add a SOE dummy to control for different cash 
level and further separate it into two subsamples. 
Our main measure of foreign sales ratio is the proportion of a ﬁrm’s total foreign sales divided by the total revenue. This 
variable is used as a proxy for how much cash ﬁrms are held abroad. All missing foreign sales ratio are replaced with zero 
value. In China, ﬁrms are recommended to disclose their foreign sales ratio starting from year 20 0 0 and required to disclose 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of ﬁrm level. 
Key variable MNC10 NMNC10 MNC50 NMNC50 
N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean 
Foreign sales ratio 4482 0 .3598 13 ,653 0 .0088 1170 0 .6984 16 ,965 0 .0539 
Cash 4482 0 .2899 13 ,648 0 .2860 1170 0 .3706 16 ,960 0 .2812 
Real size 4482 21 .3921 13 ,650 21 .2677 1170 21 .1502 16 ,962 21 .3087 
Market/Book 4372 1 .8759 13 ,307 2 .0625 1129 2 .0319 16 ,550 2 .0153 
ROE 4482 0 .0723 13 ,644 0 .0677 1170 0 .0839 16 ,956 0 .0678 
Revenue growth 4132 0 .1835 12 ,771 0 .2162 1047 0 .1998 15 ,856 0 .2088 
Cash ﬂow 4426 0 .0871 13 ,174 0 .0903 1161 0 .1009 16 ,439 0 .0887 
Net working capital 4482 –0 .0283 13 ,648 –0 .0830 1170 –0 .0175 16 ,960 –0 .0730 
CAPX 4482 0 .0837 13 ,648 0 .0734 1170 0 .0919 16 ,960 0 .0748 
Leverage 4467 0 .1982 13 ,595 0 .1982 1166 0 .1911 16 ,896 0 .1987 
Div dummy 4482 0 .6294 13 ,653 0 .5770 1170 0 .6530 16 ,965 0 .5856 
This table contains summary statistics of key variables for the full sample. The data comprises 18,135 ﬁrm-year 
observations with 1873 ﬁrms from 20 0 0 to 2013. Multinational Corporation and Non-Multinational Corpora- 
tion are classiﬁed into three bracket using 10% and 50% cutoffs ( MNC10, MNC50 are used separately). Foreign 
Sales Ratio is the proportion of foreign sales by total revenue. Cash is cash and cash equivalents plus mar- 
ketable securities divided by the net assets. Real Size is the natural log of total assets deﬂated using CPI into 
the year 1998 . Market/Book is the ratio of market value of assets divided by the book value of the net assets. 
ROE is the net income divided by book value of shareholder’s equity. Revenue Growth is the ﬁrm level annual 
total revenue growth rate. Net Working Capital is the current assets minus the current liability and cash hold- 
ing divided by net assets. CAPX is the capital expenditure divided by net assets. Leverage is the short term 
borrowing plus long term debt divided by net assets. Div Dummy is a dummy variables equals to one if a ﬁrm 
pay dividend at a given year. All ﬁrm level variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
if this ratio is more than 10% since year 2007. 2 Thus, we deﬁned a dummy variable, MNC10, for Chinese multinational 
corporations, which is one if the foreign sales ratio is greater than 10% and zero otherwise. And this cutoff is widely used 
in the literature ( Jorion, 1990; He & Ng, 1998 ; Guo, 2012). Other researchers suggest to use different cutoffs of foreign sales 
ratio to deﬁne MNCs. Shaked (1986) and Tallman & Li (1996) deﬁne MNCs as ones having 20% of sales abroad. Fernandes & 
Gonenc (2014) use 25 percent above as the standard in their international studies. For robust concern, we employ four kinds 
of cutoff in this paper: MNC (if positive), MNC10 (if more than 10%), MNC25 (if more than 25%) and MNC50 (if more than 
50%). Beside, MNC10 and MNC50 are our main focus since they are most widely used in the literature. We also include a 
dummy variable MNC1050 to be one if the foreign sales ratio is more than 10% but less than 50%. All the other key variables’ 
deﬁnitions and constructions can be seen in online Appendix. 
We use a number of control variables suggested by previous authors to explain ﬁrm’s cash holding. Table 1 presents the 
summary statistics of those variables in the sample we used. In each sample we compare the MNCs with the counterparts 
using the cutoff of 10% and 50% respectively. We can see that MNC10 sample accounts for less than one quarter of the total 
sample while MNC50 sample constitutes around only 7%. For the sample with 10% cutoff, MNCs have smaller market-to- 
book ratio, lower revenue growth, fewer cash ﬂow but more investment and more dividend payout. There are not signiﬁcant 
differences of cash holding, size and leverage ratio in this cutoff. As for the 50% cutoff, MNCs signiﬁcantly hold more cash 
than non-MNCs and those multinational ﬁrms seem to be more proﬁtable. 
3. Determinant of cash holding for MNCs 
3.1. Methodology 
Our basic speciﬁcation for the determinant of cash holdings is as follows: 
Cas h i,t = γMN C i,t + β0 SO E i + βk X i,t + αi + λt + ε i,t (1) 
where i and t denote ﬁrm i at the end of year t . The dependent variable Cash i, t is cash holdings measured as cash plus 
marketable securities scaled by net assets. MNC dummy is our main interest and is calculated as different cutoffs of foreign 
sales ratio. According to the previous literature we expect a positive and signiﬁcant relation between cash holding and 
multinational ﬁrms (i.e. a positive γ ). The SOE dummy is introduced to control for the difference between SOEs and non- 
SOEs. Soft-budget constraint theory predicts that SOE dummy should be negative since SOEs are usually with SBC that less 
ﬁnancially constrained resulting in holding less cash. X i, t are k -vector ( k equals to the number of controls) control variables 
which are chosen according to Opler et al. (1999) . 
There are two econometric techniques commonly used to ruled out potentially unobserved individual effect and variable 
yearly economic cycles: the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regression controlling for industry and year ﬁxed effects, and 
2 Accounting Standards for Enterprises No.35-Segment Report by Ministry of Finance of P.R.C. required ﬁrms to disclose the proportion of sales more 
than 10% by region (both domestic and international). These standards are effective after the year 2007. 
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Table 2 
Determinants of cash. 
Full sample SOE Non-SOE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
MNC 0 .010 ∗ 0 .002 0 .002 0 .003 
(0 .005) (0 .006) (0 .007) (0 .009) 
MNC10 0 .014 ∗∗ ––0 .001 –0 .007 –0 .005 
(0 .006) (0 .007) (0 .008) (0 .010) 
MNC25 0 .021 ∗∗∗ 0 .010 0 .003 0 .018 
(0 .007) (0 .007) (0 .009) (0 .012) 
MNC50 0 .037 ∗∗∗ 0 .029 ∗∗∗ 0 .048 ∗∗∗ 0 .011 
(0 .011) (0 .011) (0 .015) (0 .015) 
SOE –0 .030 ∗∗∗ –0 .030 ∗∗∗ –0 .030 ∗∗∗ –0 .029 ∗∗∗ –0 .029 ∗∗∗
(0 .005) (0 .005) (0 .005) (0 .005) (0 .005) 
Market/Book 0 .018 ∗∗∗ 0 .018 ∗∗∗ 0 .018 ∗∗∗ 0 .018 ∗∗∗ 0 .018 ∗∗∗ 0 .032 ∗∗∗ 0 .011 ∗∗∗
(0 .002) (0 .002) (0 .002) (0 .002) (0 .002) (0 .004) (0 .003) 
Real size –0 .015 ∗∗∗ –0 .015 ∗∗∗ –0 .015 ∗∗∗ –0 .014 ∗∗∗ –0 .014 ∗∗∗ –0 .006 ∗ –0 .022 ∗∗∗
(0 .003) (0 .003) (0 .003) (0 .003) (0 .003) (0 .003) (0 .005) 
Cash ﬂow 0 .778 ∗∗∗ 0 .778 ∗∗∗ 0 .776 ∗∗∗ 0 .774 ∗∗∗ 0 .774 ∗∗∗ 0 .573 ∗∗∗ 0 .891 ∗∗∗
(0 .037) (0 .037) (0 .037) (0 .037) (0 .037) (0 .055) (0 .048) 
Net working capital –0 .130 ∗∗∗ –0 .130 ∗∗∗ –0 .130 ∗∗∗ –0 .129 ∗∗∗ –0 .130 ∗∗∗ –0 .177 ∗∗∗ –0 .117 ∗∗∗
(0 .014) (0 .014) (0 .014) (0 .014) (0 .014) (0 .020) (0 .018) 
CAPX 0 .142 ∗∗∗ 0 .141 ∗∗∗ 0 .140 ∗∗∗ 0 .139 ∗∗∗ 0 .138 ∗∗∗ 0 .041 0 .201 ∗∗∗
(0 .025) (0 .025) (0 .025) (0 .025) (0 .025) (0 .034) (0 .036) 
Leverage –0 .331 ∗∗∗ –0 .331 ∗∗∗ –0 .332 ∗∗∗ –0 .332 ∗∗∗ –0 .333 ∗∗∗ –0 .340 ∗∗∗ –0 .348 ∗∗∗
(0 .020) (0 .020) (0 .020) (0 .020) (0 .020) (0 .027) (0 .028) 
Div dummy 0 .020 ∗∗∗ 0 .020 ∗∗∗ 0 .020 ∗∗∗ 0 .020 ∗∗∗ 0 .019 ∗∗∗ 0 .011 ∗∗ 0 .035 ∗∗∗
(0 .004) (0 .004) (0 .004) (0 .004) (0 .004) (0 .005) (0 .007) 
Constant 0 .509 ∗∗∗ 0 .503 ∗∗∗ 0 .497 ∗∗∗ 0 .496 ∗∗∗ 0 .496 ∗∗∗ 0 .303 ∗∗∗ 0 .634 ∗∗∗
(0 .058) (0 .058) (0 .058) (0 .058) (0 .058) (0 .073) (0 .096) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 17 ,096 17 ,096 17 ,096 17 ,096 17 ,096 9445 7651 
adj. R-sq 0 .404 0 .404 0 .405 0 .405 0 .406 0 .407 0 .435 
This table present the ﬁrm-level cash determinants from 20 0 0 to 2013. The last two column separate the full sam- 
ples into SOE and non-SOE subsamples. The dependent variable in all regression is the natural log of cash, which is 
calculated as cash holding divided by the net assets. SOE is a dummy variable set to one if the ﬁrm is state-owned 
enterprise. All the other independent variables are deﬁned in Online Appendix. Industry dummy variables are con- 
structed for each industry deﬁned as three-level CIS code. All speciﬁcations include industry and year ﬁxed effect. 
The standard errors are clustered at ﬁrm level. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ and ∗ indicate signiﬁcance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
the panel regression controlling for ﬁrm and year ﬁxed effects. As shown in the Table 1 , most of ﬁrms are non-multinational 
so it is diﬃcult to distinguish the invariant ﬁrm effect from the MNC dummy. Thus, we choose pooled OLS regression to 
avoid potential multicollinearity problem existing between the MNC dummy and the ﬁrm identity. The following reported 
t -statistics are based on robust standard errors which are clustered by ﬁrm level as Peterson (2009) suggests in order to 
rule out the potential heteroscedasticity. 
3.2. Empirical results 
We start our analysis by estimating speciﬁcation of Eq. (1) using four different cutoffs. Table 2 shows the multivariate 
regression of ﬁrm-level cash determinants. The dependent variable in all regressions is the natural log of cash divided by 
net assets and the independent variables are following Opler et.al (1999) and Meggion et.al (2014) . In order to control for 
industry-adjust and year-adjust unobserved effects, we include dummy variables for each industry 3 and each year. 
We ﬁnd that our main interest variables, MNC dummies, are all signiﬁcantly positive in those models, seemingly consis- 
tent with the hypothesis that multinational ﬁrms do hold more cash, and the magnitude is larger in column (3) and (4). 
However, if all MNC dummies are introduced (column 5) we notice that only MNC50 is signiﬁcant and positive. It shows 
that only for those ﬁrms with 50% or more foreign sales ratio that signiﬁcantly hold more cash compared with the domestic 
oriented ﬁrms. 
The result further indicates that SOE ﬁrms hold less cash. 4 This is consistent with SBC theory and the empirical ﬁnding 
of Megginson et al. (2014) . Besides, we ﬁnd that smaller ﬁrms and ﬁrms with higher market-to-book hold more cash. Net 
3 Three level CIS industry is used here. We also try to use 2-digit SIC B classiﬁcations deﬁned by China Security Regulatory Commission ( Meggison et al., 
2014 ) and the result is still robust. 
4 SOE hold about 3% percent less cash than non-SOE: the magnitude is about 0.287 ∗(-0.03) = -0.0086 or 0.86% less of cash ratio. 
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working capital and leverage ratio are signiﬁcantly negative with cash holdings, supporting the tradeoff theory that cash and 
working capital are substitutes. It also shows that cash ratio is signiﬁcantly positive with cash ﬂow and investment, which 
is consistent with previous empirical evidence ( Opler et al., 1999 and Harford, 1999, Dittmar et al., 2003; Ozkan and Ozkan, 
2004; Kalcheva and Lins, 2007 ). However, the dividend-paying ﬁrms seem to hold more cash in China, which is contrary to 
the existing ﬁndings. It suggests that Chinese ﬁrms hold more cash for precautionary motive to avoid raising funds from the 
underdeveloped bond market or the seasoned equity market ( Liu and Lu, 2007; Megginson, 2014) . 5 
Columns 6 and 7 examine the inﬂuences on SOEs and non-SOEs. For SOEs (column 6), the coeﬃcient of MNC50 is much 
larger in the subsample than that in full sample, which indicates that multinational ﬁrms hold even more cash in SOE 
sample. As for non-SOEs (column 7), the coeﬃcients of all MNC dummies are positive but not signiﬁcant. Compared with 
SOE subsample, we notice that signiﬁcance of the MNC dummies vanishes in non-SOE sample, which implies that non-SOEs 
multinational ﬁrms do not hold signiﬁcant more cash than their counterparts. 
Overall, the results indicate that multinational ﬁrms in China do not hold signiﬁcantly more cash relative to the non- 
multinationals, except for the 50% foreign sales ratio cutoff and this insigniﬁcance is dominant in non-SOE subsample. The 
latter result reﬂects the explanations. 
4. MNCs, investment decision, and valuation 
The previous section shows that multinational ﬁrms do not hold more cash in non-SOE subsample and SOEs do not hold 
more cash unless they have more than 50% foreign sales ratio. In this section, we attribute the reason to some speciﬁc ﬁrm 
characteristics. 
In this section, we follow the methods applied by Harford et al. (2008) to study ﬁrm’s cash position through the channels 
of investment and proﬁtability. To simplify the study, we reduce the foreign sales ratio into three brackets: ratio less than 
10%, with 10% to 50% (MNC1050) and more than 50% (MNC50). We assume that MNCs are more likely to invest cash be- 
cause they are globally diversiﬁed with more investment opportunities. However, the investment of MNCs may not be more 
proﬁtable than their domestic peers due to the diversiﬁcation concern, which further gets the difference in cash holdings 
insigniﬁcant. 
4.1. Cash and investment decision 
In this part, we examine the relation between ﬁrms’ investment decisions and multinationals. Speciﬁcally, we focus on 
the sign of MNC dummy variable related to ﬁrm’s future investment decision. The investment variable is deﬁned as capital 
expenditures which equal to net investment in ﬁxed assets scaled by net assets. We deﬁne ﬁrms’ cash position as the 
unexplained proportion of cash holdings using the column (1) in Table 2 . That is, the residual from regressing cash holdings 
by net assets on SOE dummy, ﬁrm real size, investment opportunities, cash ﬂow, net working capital, capital expenditure on 
net assets, leverage and dividend dummy as well as industry and year indicators. Besides, we also introduce the change of 
excess cash position, revenue growth, net working capital, leverage and lagged ﬁrm size as Harford et al. (2008) . 
The result is shown in Table 3 . In the full sample regression, we only ﬁnd that ﬁrms with 50% more foreign sales ratio 
invest more than non-MNC. Naturally, lagged investment level accounts for a signiﬁcant portion of ﬁrm’s current investment. 
SOE dummy is positive but not signiﬁcant in all the models. Both the lagged and the change in cash residuals are positively 
related to the investment decision, which means that ﬁrms with more excess cash tend to invest next year or ﬁrms tend to 
accumulate the cash to invest in the long-run. We also note that ﬁrms with high revenue growth and lagged size tend to 
increase their current investment level. 
We next separate the sample into SOE and non-SOE subsample. For SOEs, MNC50 is marginally signiﬁcant and negative 
but we do not see signiﬁcance for MNC1050 (column 5). It can partially explain why SOE ﬁrms with more than 50% foreign 
sales ratio hold more cash. Contrary to the SOE sample, we also ﬁnd that in non-SOEs, the coeﬃcient of MNC50 is signiﬁ- 
cantly positive and the magnitude is much larger than that in full sample. More speciﬁcally, in column 7, MNC1050 also has 
a signiﬁcant and positive coeﬃcient which indicates that MNC10 also invest more than NMNC10. This result indicates that 
non-SOE MNCs do not hold more cash since they tend to invest more, while SOE MNCs have more cash because they invest 
less and it exacerbates when SOE MNC’s foreign sales ratio is larger than 50%. 
4.2. Cash and market-to-book value 
Using similar approach, we now examine how multinational dummies are related to ﬁrm’s future market to book value. 
Similarly, we include ﬁrm’s lagged MNC dummies together with lagged market to book value in the models and introducing 
industry and yearly ﬁxed effects. Additional control variables, such as revenue growth, net working capital and lagged real 
size, are included. 
The result is reported is shown is Table 4 . Lagged market to book value explains the majority part of ﬁrm’s current 
value. Neither the level of cash residual nor the change in the cash residual is related to the current market to book of the 
5 The Chinese Security Regulatory Commission (CSRC) uses return of equity (ROE) as criterion for rights offering and seasoned new issues and the latest 
requirement for a ﬁrm to be eligible for the right offerings and seasoned new issues is at least have a three-year average ROE ( Liu and Lu, 2007 ). 
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Table 3 
Cash and investment decision. 
Full sample SOE Non-SOE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
MNC1050(Lag) 0 .001 0 .002 –0 .001 0 .005 ∗∗
(0 .001) (0 .001) (0 .002) (0 .002) 
MNC50(Lag) 0 .005 ∗∗ 0 .005 ∗∗ –0 .005 ∗ –0 .005 ∗ 0 .009 ∗∗∗ 0 .010 ∗∗∗
(0 .002) (0 .002) (0 .003) (0 .003) (0 .003) (0 .003) 
SOE 0 .002 0 .002 0 .002 
(0 .001) (0 .001) (0 .001) 
CAPX(Lag) 0 .522 ∗∗∗ 0 .521 ∗∗∗ 0 .521 ∗∗∗ 0 .558 ∗∗∗ 0 .558 ∗∗∗ 0 .500 ∗∗∗ 0 .498 ∗∗∗
(0 .009) (0 .010) (0 .010) (0 .013) (0 .013) (0 .014) (0 .014) 
Real size(Lag) 0 .002 ∗∗∗ 0 .002 ∗∗∗ 0 .002 ∗∗∗ 0 .001 0 .001 0 .003 ∗∗∗ 0 .003 ∗∗∗
(0 .001) (0 .001) (0 .001) (0 .001) (0 .001) (0 .001) (0 .001) 
Cash Res(Lag) 0 .015 ∗∗∗ 0 .015 ∗∗∗ 0 .014 ∗∗∗ 0 .003 0 .003 0 .030 ∗∗∗ 0 .030 ∗∗∗
(0 .005) (0 .005) (0 .005) (0 .007) (0 .007) (0 .006) (0 .006) 
Cash Res(Lag) 0 .020 ∗∗∗ 0 .020 ∗∗∗ 0 .020 ∗∗∗ 0 .035 ∗∗∗ 0 .035 ∗∗∗ 0 .007 0 .007 
(0 .005) (0 .005) (0 .005) (0 .008) (0 .008) (0 .007) (0 .007) 
Revenue growth 0 .008 ∗∗∗ 0 .008 ∗∗∗ 0 .008 ∗∗∗ 0 .007 ∗∗∗ 0 .006 ∗∗∗ 0 .009 ∗∗∗ 0 .009 ∗∗∗
(0 .001) (0 .001) (0 .001) (0 .002) (0 .002) (0 .002) (0 .002) 
Net working capital 0 .004 0 .004 0 .004 –0 .004 –0 .004 0 .002 0 .002 
(0 .002) (0 .002) (0 .002) (0 .003) (0 .003) (0 .003) (0 .003) 
Leverage –0 .007 –0 .007 –0 .007 –0 .006 –0 .005 –0 .008 –0 .008 
(0 .004) (0 .004) (0 .004) (0 .005) (0 .005) (0 .007) (0 .007) 
Constant –0 .018 –0 .018 ∗ –0 .018 ∗ 0 .004 0 .004 –0 .035 ∗ –0 .034 ∗
(0 .011) (0 .011) (0 .011) (0 .014) (0 .014) (0 .018) (0 .018) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 13 ,095 13 ,095 13 ,095 7605 7605 5490 5490 
adj. R-sq 0 .373 0 .373 0 .373 0 .387 0 .387 0 .345 0 .346 
This table present the ﬁrm-level investment decision from 20 0 0 to 2013. The dependent variable in all regression is 
CAPX, calculated as the capital expenditures divided by net assets. SOE is a dummy variable set to one if the ﬁrm is 
state-owned enterprise. Specially, the cash residual from regression cash determines on ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics 
represents the ﬁrms’ excess cash holdings. All the other independent variables are deﬁned in Online Appendix. In- 
dustry dummy variables are constructed for each industry deﬁned as three-level CIS code. All speciﬁcations include 
industry and year ﬁxed effect. The standard errors are clustered at ﬁrm level. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ and ∗ indicate signiﬁcance level 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
ﬁrm. As for multinational dummies, we ﬁnd that both MNC1050 and MNC50 are negative and signiﬁcant. For MNC50, the 
multinational ﬁrms have 7.3% lower valuation than their industry peers and for MNC10 it has 2.9% ( = −7.3% + 4.4%) lower 
valuation. And if we separate sample into SOE and non-SOE subsample, the coeﬃcient of MNC dummies are still negative 
and but only signiﬁcant in non-SOE subsample (column 7). 
In sum, all the empirical results show that ﬁrms’ multinational characteristics, as measured by MNC dummies, are signif- 
icantly positive related with ﬁrm’s future investment but negative related to ﬁrm’s future value. It strengthens the statement 
that those MNCs do not hold more cash since they have more investment and are usually less proﬁtable, especially in non- 
SOE subsample. 
5. Conclusions 
This study examines the cash holdings of multinationals in China. We ﬁnd that Chinese multinational ﬁrms do not sig- 
niﬁcantly hold more cash than non-multinationals, except for MNCs with more than 50% foreign sales ratio. Analysis on 
the SOEs and non-SOEs show that the impact of multinational on cash holdings is not signiﬁcantly positive in those non- 
SOEs. Furthermore, non-SOEs with more 50% foreign sales, which imply more investing in capital expenditure. Finally, we 
examine if the differences are reﬂected with ﬁrm’s future value. The relation of multinationals and proﬁtability are negative 
and this relation is more pronounced in non-SOEs subsample. This unproﬁtability partly explains the insigniﬁcance of the 
relation between multinationals and cash holdings in China. We conclude that multinational corporations in China do not 
hold signiﬁcantly more cash since they tend to invest more and are less proﬁtable, expect for those SOEs with more than 
50% foreign sales. 
The results suggest that, contrary to U.S., Chinese multinational corporations do not hold signiﬁcantly more cash than the 
domestic ones since they have more investment projects and are not such proﬁtable. A further explanation might be that, as 
in the early stage of global expansion, Chinese multinationals invest plenty of cash to support their international operations 
and try to diversify their risks in other developed countries. The diversiﬁcation concern might result in the unproﬁtability. 
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Table 4 
Cash and valuation. 
Full sample SOE Non-SOE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
MNC1050(Lag) –0 .034 ∗ –0 .044 ∗∗ –0 .024 –0 .064 ∗
(0 .020) (0 .021) (0 .026) (0 .036) 
MNC50(Lag) –0 .060 ∗∗ –0 .073 ∗∗ –0 .058 –0 .066 –0 .063 –0 .084 ∗
(0 .030) (0 .031) (0 .040) (0 .041) (0 .044) (0 .046) 
SOE –0 .055 ∗∗∗ –0 .057 ∗∗∗ –0 .056 ∗∗∗
(0 .020) (0 .020) (0 .020) 
MB(Lag) 0 .693 ∗∗∗ 0 .693 ∗∗∗ 0 .692 ∗∗∗ 0 .649 ∗∗∗ 0 .649 ∗∗∗ 0 .696 ∗∗∗ 0 .694 ∗∗∗
(0 .015) (0 .015) (0 .015) (0 .022) (0 .022) (0 .022) (0 .022) 
Cash Res(Lag) 0 .047 0 .053 0 .054 0 .212 ∗∗ 0 .211 ∗∗ –0 .025 –0 .022 
(0 .081) (0 .081) (0 .081) (0 .104) (0 .104) (0 .127) (0 .128) 
Cash Res(Lag) 0 .131 0 .129 0 .128 –0 .017 –0 .017 0 .279 ∗ 0 .278 ∗
(0 .098) (0 .098) (0 .098) (0 .124) (0 .124) (0 .143) (0 .143) 
Revenue growth –0 .217 ∗∗∗ –0 .217 ∗∗∗ –0 .218 ∗∗∗ –0 .106 ∗∗∗ –0 .106 ∗∗∗ –0 .313 ∗∗∗ –0 .314 ∗∗∗
(0 .037) (0 .037) (0 .037) (0 .036) (0 .036) (0 .059) (0 .059) 
Net working capital –0 .811 ∗∗∗ –0 .812 ∗∗∗ –0 .810 ∗∗∗ –0 .586 ∗∗∗ –0 .585 ∗∗∗ –1 .026 ∗∗∗ –1 .027 ∗∗∗
(0 .072) (0 .072) (0 .072) (0 .096) (0 .096) (0 .111) (0 .111) 
Leverage –0 .978 ∗∗∗ –0 .978 ∗∗∗ –0 .975 ∗∗∗ –0 .825 ∗∗∗ –0 .822 ∗∗∗ –1 .228 ∗∗∗ –1 .229 ∗∗∗
(0 .083) (0 .083) (0 .083) (0 .089) (0 .088) (0 .158) (0 .158) 
Real size(Lag) –0 .178 ∗∗∗ –0 .178 ∗∗∗ –0 .178 ∗∗∗ –0 .153 ∗∗∗ –0 .153 ∗∗∗ –0 .244 ∗∗∗ –0 .243 ∗∗∗
(0 .013) (0 .013) (0 .013) (0 .016) (0 .016) (0 .026) (0 .026) 
Constant 4 .900 ∗∗∗ 4 .908 ∗∗∗ 4 .916 ∗∗∗ 4 .299 ∗∗∗ 4 .304 ∗∗∗ 6 .424 ∗∗∗ 6 .420 ∗∗∗
(0 .301) (0 .301) (0 .301) (0 .387) (0 .386) (0 .577) (0 .577) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 12 ,931 12 ,931 12 ,931 7536 7536 5395 5395 
adj. R-sq 0 .685 0 .685 0 .685 0 .652 0 .652 0 .705 0 .705 
This table present the ﬁrm-level market-to-book from 20 0 0 to 2013. The dependent variable in all regression is 
Market/Book , deﬁned as market value divided by the book value of net assets. SOE is a dummy variable set to 
one if the ﬁrm is state-owned enterprise. Specially, the cash residual from regression cash determines on ﬁrm- 
speciﬁc characteristics represents the ﬁrms’ excess cash holdings. Due to the endogeneity concerns, we include 
ﬁrms’ lag market-to-book into the models. All the other independent variables are deﬁned in Online Appendix. In- 
dustry dummy variables are constructed for each industry deﬁned as three-level CIS code. All speciﬁcations include 
industry and year ﬁxed effect. The standard errors are clustered at ﬁrm level. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ and ∗ indicate signiﬁcance level 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Supplementary materials 
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at 10.1016/j.frl.2016.09.024 . 
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